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EVIDENCE: APPLICATION AND REFINEMENT
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
GLENN A. RICE*
THOMAS S. ORR**
Almost a decade has now passed since the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence were enacted' in response to the persistent urgings from a federal
bar and bench straining under the burden of an unmanageable number of
evidentiary doctrines. 2 Although some feared that the codification of
common law evidentiary principles would encourage and result in a
wooden application of black letter law, 3 time has proven these fears un-
founded. The Federal Rules are anything but a rigid black letter code.4
The federal courts have recognized that the Rules are largely comprised
of general principles or guidelines which are to be construed with suffi-
cient flexibility to promote the development of the law of evidence to the
ends of justice as Rule 1025 mandates.
During the 1983-84 term, the United States Court of Appeals for the
* B.S., Northern Illinois University, 1982; Candidate for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law, 1985.
** B.A., Valparaiso University, 1970; Candidate for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1987.
1. The Federal Rules of Evidence were signed into law by President Ford on January 2, 1975,
and became effective on July 1, 1975. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. app. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
2. See Green, Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 177, 181 (1967).
3. Perhaps the most notable critic of the Federal Rules was Judge Henry J. Friendly who
stated, while testifying before Congress in opposition to the Federal Rules:
[O]ne may fairly ask what harm there is in a code of evidence, provided it is a good code.
My first answer is that evidence is not the kind of subject that lends itself to codification. It
is peculiarly a subject for the common law system of judicial development by examination
of the actual facts in each case in an adversary setting. . . . The Proposed Rules would
tend to freeze the federal law of evidence, except at the intervals, necessarily long, when the
Rules were revised. To be sure, Rule 102 instructs the courts to "construe" the Rules so as
to promote "growth and development of the law of evidence." But there is not much room
for "growth and development" when a judge is firmly bound by 161 pages of rules and
commentary.
Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal
Law of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 262 (1973) (statement of Henry J.
Friendly).
4. For a recent discussion on the positive and negative consequences of codifying the law of
evidence after almost a decade of experience with the Federal Rules, see Berger, The Federal Rules
of Evidence.- Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255 (1984).
5. FED. R. EvID. 102 provides: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in adminis-
tration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
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Seventh Circuit decided a number of interesting and important cases
which continued the process of developing and refining the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 6 This article presents a selective examination of cases from
the 1983-84 term which illustrate the evolving evidentiary jurisprudence
of the Seventh Circuit. Since evidentiary questions were routinely
presented and ruled upon in numerous cases during the Seventh Circuit's
last term, this article highlights only those decisions which either indicate
a trend, depart from precedent or the Federal Rules, or are otherwise
likely to have a substantial impact upon future decisions.
RULE 403: EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE
An important method utilized in the Federal Rules of Evidence to
accomplish its fundamental goals of fairness and flexibility 7 is its broad
theory of relevancy. Under these rules, all relevant evidence is admissi-
ble8 and is defined in Rule 401 as any "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be with-
out the evidence."9 Conversely, Rule 403 provides trial courts with a
practical device to control or limit the flood of evidence flowing from the
broad application of Rules 401 and 402.10 Thus, even relevant evidence
"may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion," or "waste of time.""1
Although the language of Rule 403 is discretionary, it too favors
admission of relevant evidence, 12 and trial judges are necessarily given
broad powers in balancing the probative value of questionable evidence
6. FED. R. EVID. 101-1103.
7. FED. R. EVID. 102.
8. FED. R. EVID. 402.
9. FED. R. EVID. 401.
10. FED. R. EVID. 403. Advisory Committee Note states:
The case law recognizes that certain circumstances call for the exclusion of evidence which
is of unquestioned relevance. These circumstances entail risks which range all of the way
from inducing decision on a purely emotional basis, at one extreme, to nothing more harm-
ful than merely wasting time, at the other extreme. Situations in this area call for balanc-
ing the probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result from
its admission.
11. FED. R. EvID. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
12. "The phrasing of Rule 403 makes it clear that the discretion to exclude does not arise when
the balance between the probative worth and the countervailing factors is debatable; there must be a
significant tipping of the scales against the evidentiary worth of the proffered evidence." 22 WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5221, 309-10 (1978).
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against its prejudicial impact. 13 The variety of situations giving rise to
the balancing of questionable evidence is so broad that reference to any
particular fact patterns in previously decided cases is of little value. 14
Indeed, maintaining the flexibility inherent in Rule 403 requires the exer-
cise of discretion by the trial judge based on the particular facts of each
case.' 5 This need for discretion unfortunately has made it difficult for
appellate courts on review and has prompted them to encourage, without
requiring, trial judges to enter written findings on the balance between
probity and unfair prejudice. 16 However, the case by case decisions have
not led to the development of a generally accepted idea of what consti-
tutes unfair prejudice.' 7 The courts' failure to develop a consistent defini-
tion of unfair prejudice through the current ad hoc approach has led
some to question the usefulness of Rule 403.18
During the 1983-84 term the Seventh Circuit had several opportuni-
ties to review decisions involving the Rule 403 balancing test. An inter-
esting but unusual example was presented by Wilk v. American Medical
Association, 19 where the court reversed the trial court because certain evi-
dence was so prejudicial that it was an abuse of discretion not to exclude
it under Rule 403.20 In Wilk, the plaintiffs, who were chiropractors,
brought a civil antitrust action against the AMA and other medical
groups alleging that they engaged in a combination and conspiracy to
eliminate the chiropractic profession by refusing to deal with the plain-
tiffs on a professional basis and by denying them access to hospital, labo-
13. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lea,
618 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d
102, 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979).
14. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.1, at 183 n.16 (1981).
15. Id.
16. United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979).
17. FED. R. EVID. 403, Advisory Committee Note defines unfair prejudice as "an undue ten-
dency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one."
18. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial
Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497 (1983). The author concluded:
As the number and variety of cases applying Rule 403 mounts, the cost of the failure to
develop a coherent definition of unfair prejudice becomes increasingly clear. Without a
guide to identifying or measuring the danger of unfair prejudice, the balancing required by
Rule 403 cannot meaningfully be conducted. How the courts use their discretion to ex-
clude evidence under Rule 403 can neither be predicted nor effectively reviewed. The
claim of unfair prejudice has become the closing shot of every objection, trivializing an
important principle while unduly increasing the number of legal issues that must be de-
cided before the presentation of evidence may proceed. The efficacy of Rule 403, which is a
basic assumption behind the expansion of admissibility under the Federal Rules, has be-
come doubtful.
Id. at 498.
19. 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984).
20. Id. at 232.
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ratory, and other diagnostic services. 2' The plaintiffs, who were
unconcerned with the motives of the defendants, contended that at vari-
ous times each of the defendants had done certain things designed to
affect the chiropractors' ability to compete with medical doctors. The
defendants did not deny these activities but attempted to prove that their
actions arose in good faith as a result of their sincere, genuine belief that
chiropractic was dangerous quackery. They asserted that their conduct
was undertaken in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare
rather than for any commercial benefit.
Prior to trial, the district judge struck the defendants' affirmative
defenses of public interest, non-commercial conduct, and clean hands.
However, he denied the plaintiffs' motion in limine to exclude all evi-
dence pertaining to the public health, safety, or welfare. It was the
judge's opinion that this evidence was relevant to determining whether
the defendants did or did not actually conspire; whether there was a per
se violation of the Sherman Act; and whether the equitable relief sought
by the plaintiffs was an available remedy. As a result, the trial was "a
free-for-all between chiropractors and medical doctors, in which the sci-
entific legitimacy of chiropractic was hotly debated and the comparative
intensity of the avarice of the adversaries was explored."'22
Although the appellate court agreed that the public interest evi-
dence was relevant to the defendants' genuine belief that chiropractic is
quackery and that this belief had some legal significance at trial, the
court objected to the "extravagant volume of evidence" permitted by the
trial judge as well as its emphasis on alleged financial greed and lack of
integrity among chiropractors. 23 Expressing concern that this evidence
created such a danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of issues, the
court reluctantly held that it was an abuse of discretion not to exclude it
under rule 403.24
21. According to the evidence presented at trial, the alleged boycott had its beginning in 1963
when the AMA Board of Trustees established the Committee on Quackery. Its prime mission was
the containment and then the eventual elimination of chiropractic. In 1966, upon the Committee's
recommendation, the AMA House of Delegates adopted a resolution asserting that chiropractic was
"an unscientific cult whose practitioners lack the necessary training and background to diagnose and
treat human disease." Id. at 213-14. The Committee used this resolution as a basis to solicit and
induce cooperation from the codefendant organizations in professionally ostracizing chiropractors.
As a result, chiropractors were denied access to hospital facilities, X-ray and laboratory facilities,
and clinical research and educational activities. Moreover, referrals and diagnostic help from the
medical doctors were reduced to a point where public demand for chiropractic services was nega-
tively affected. Id. at 214.
22. Id. at 216.
23. Id. at 232. For example, volumes of evidence were admitted concerning one plaintiff's ar-
rangement with a furniture store for the sale of mattresses to his patients.
24. Id.
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The decision in Wilk is an uncommon example of the application of
Rule 403 to reverse a decision of the trial court. Balancing was not dis-
cussed in the decision, and the appellate court did not refer to any previ-
ous cases with similar facts or cite any other authority. The court simply
reviewed the evidence admitted at trial and reached the opposite conclu-
sion of the district court. Consequently, this case does not provide any
particular insight into the meaning of "unfair prejudice" or the proper
application of Rule 403.
In contrast, the court's interpretation of Rule 403 in United States v.
Gutman25 is based closely and predictably on familiar Seventh Circuit
evidentiary principles. In Gutman, the former president pro tern of the
Indiana Senate was prosecuted under the Hobbs Act for using his official
position to extort $333 a month for five years from a railroad association
in exchange for his help in getting the state's "full crew" law repealed.
The prosecution presented testimony of an earlier payment of $40,000 to
Gutman by the same railroad association under circumstances strongly
suggestive of extortion. Gutman objected to the admission of this evi-
dence, pointing out that the $40,000 payment was not part of the indict-
ment. He contended that the admission of evidence of another crime was
improper and unfairly prejudicial.
Although the court agreed that evidence of the prior payment was
indeed prejudicial, the Seventh Circuit upheld its admissibility under
Rule 403.26 Gutman did not deny receiving the monthly checks but
claimed they were payments for legal services rendered. The court noted
that the facts surrounding the $40,000 payment which Gutman also
claimed was payment for legal services tended to discredit his testimony
concerning the monthly checks and was therefore material to the current
extortion charge. Moreover, because he received the monthly payments
through a third person, the evidence was necessary to connect Gutman
with the association. Finally, the evidence was clear and convincing
since it was admitted through the direct testimony of an officer of the
association. 27  Consequently, the appellate court held that the district
judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that the probative value
25. 725 F.2d 417 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 244 (1984).
26. Id. at 421. All effective evidence is necessarily prejudicial in that it is damaging to the party
against whom it is offered. However, "rule 403 is not contravened by evidence that might show only
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged." United States v. Monahan, 633 F.2d 984, 985 (1st
Cir. 1980). To be excluded, the evidence must be unfair. Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d
613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
27. Gutman, 725 F.2d at 421. Direct testimony from a witness with first hand knowledge al-
ways satisfies the clear and convincing test. See United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 245 n. 14
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 110 (1983); United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 1239
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 (1980).
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of the prior $40,000 payment outweighed its prejudicial impact. 28
The holding in Gutman relied exclusively on the Seventh Circuit's
previous decision in United States v. Dolliole ,29 where the court discussed
in detail the role of the balancing test in the admission of prior crimes
evidence. Dolliole provides that evidence of prior crimes is admissible
under the balancing test of Rule 403 where the evidence is clear and
convincing and is reasonably necessary in proving an essential element of
the crime. 30  Further, substantial deference is given to the evidentiary
ruling of the trial judge who is in a better position to determine the preju-
dicial impact of the disputed evidence on the jury.3 1
RULE 404: CHARACTER EVIDENCE
While the admissibility of evidence of other crimes or acts is proba-
bly the most frequently litigated issue under Rule 403,32 evidence of
other crimes or acts presents issues under Rule 404(b) 33 as well. Rule
404(b) codifies the long standing common law principle 34 that evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to establish the charac-
ter of a person as circumstantial proof of the person's conduct on a par-
ticular occasion.35 Thus, evidence that a person charged with burglary
has previously been convicted of shoplifting is inadmissible to prove that
28. Gutman, 725 F.2d at 421.
29. 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979). In Dolliole, evidence that the
defendant had participated in two prior bank robberies was admitted in his trial on charges of being
an accomplice in the robbery of a savings and loan association. Id. at 106. For an excellent discus-
sion of this case, see Cole, Evidence: Developments in Character Evidence, Cross-Examination Rules,
and Prior Consistent Statements, 56 CHI-KENT L. REV. 279, 281-85 (1980).
30. 597 F.2d at 106-07.
31. Id. at 107.
32. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5215, at 281.
33. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
34. The Supreme Court succinctly stated this principle in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 475-76 (1948):
The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill
name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is
by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because
character is irrelevant; on the contrary it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair oppor-
tunity to defend against a particular charge.
See also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 189, at 445-46 (Cleary ed. 1972).
35. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). In United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1979), the
court notes that the first sentence of Rule 404(b) expresses two concerns:
(1) that the jury may convict a "bad man" who deserves to be punished-not because he
is guilty of the crime charged but because of his prior or subsequent misdeeds; and (2) that
the jury will infer that because the accused committed other crimes, he probably commit-
ted the crime charged.
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the person is by nature dishonest and therefore likely to have committed
the burglary. However, the second sentence of Rule 404(b) provides that
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible "as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident."' 36 This list is not meant to be all-inclu-
sive, and Rule 404(b) is generally understood to mean that such evidence
is admissible, if relevant, for any purpose other than to prove mere pro-
pensity to commit the crime. 37 Of course, the probative value of the
other crimes evidence must always outweigh its prejudicial impact as re-
quired by Rule 403.38 Therefore, evidence of other crimes or prior bad
acts often requires consideration under both Rule 403 and Rule 404(b) to
determine its admissibility.
During the last term, several cases were decided by the Seventh Cir-
cuit dealing with evidence of prior crimes or bad acts. This section will
discuss the more important cases involving intent, background, and
knowledge.
Intent
Three of the cases in which evidence of prior acts was admitted to
prove intent presented similar issues and were analyzed similarly by the
court. In the first case, United States v. Wormick,39 the defendant, a po-
lice officer, was convicted on five counts of mail fraud in a scheme
designed to defraud an insurance company by submission of false auto-
mobile accident and theft claims. Wormick's part in the scheme con-
sisted of writing false police reports. Wormick admitted writing the
reports, but insisted he was an unwilling dupe of the other participants
and merely recorded information given to him during his official duties.
On appeal, he challenged the admission of evidence of an unrelated inci-
dent which resulted in his demotion from sergeant to patrolman for falsi-
fying a police report involving a shooting.
The second case, United States v. Stump,4° involved a physician who
was convicted of illegally prescribing controlled substances. On appeal,
the defendant challenged the admission of evidence of illegal prescrip-
36. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
37. United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 271 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 106-07 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
946 (1979); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
920 (1979).
39. 709 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1983).
40. 735 F.2d 273 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 203 (1984).
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tions which he wrote prior to the date of the charged crime and which
were not included in the indictment.
In the third case, United States v. Kane,41 the defendant was con-
victed of conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute. The
charges against the defendant arose from a drug sale to undercover of-
ficers in which he did not actually take part. The trial court admitted
testimony of an undercover agent concerning a conversation with the de-
fendant nineteen months previously wherein the defendant openly dis-
cussed his extensive cocaine business. The defendant objected to this
evidence as a violation of Rule 404.
In analyzing the admissibility of the prior acts evidence in each of
these cases, the Seventh Circuit utilized the four part test set out in
United States v. Feinberg.42  The first element of this test requires the
prior bad acts to be similar in kind and close enough in time to be rele-
vant.43 In Wormick, both the charged crime and the prior act involved
falsifying police reports, and the prior act occurred during the same time
period as the charged crime.44 In Stump, the prior act was also the same
as the charged crime (writing illegal prescriptions), and the time between
the incidents was less than a year.45 Likewise, in Kane, the similarity in
acts (drug dealing) was indisputable, and the nineteen months between
the incidents was not considered to be too remote to be relevant.4 6 The
Seventh Circuit has held previously that five years between the prior act
and the charged crime did not disqualify the evidence. 47
The second element of the Feinberg test is that the evidence must be
clear and convincing. The clear and convincing standard is designed to
prevent the admission of circumstantial evidence or the mere inference of
the defendant's participation in a prior crime.48 In all three of the cases,
the clear and convincing standard was satisfied by testimony of witnesses
41. 726 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1984).
42. 535 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976). This guide indicates that evi-
dence of prior bad acts is admissible to prove specific intent when:
(1) the prior act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant, (2) the evi-
dence of the prior act is clear and convincing, (3) the probative value of the evidence out-
weighs the risk of prejudice, and (4) the issue to which the evidence is aimed is disputed by
the defendant.
Id. at 1009.
43. The similarity is relevant only to the degree that the acts are sufficiently alike to support an
inference of criminal intent. United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 1238 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 858 (1980).
44. Wormick, 709 F.2d at 459.
45. Stump, 735 F.2d at 275.
46. Kane, 726 F.2d at 348.
47. See United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Zeidman,
540 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1976).
48. Dolliole, 597 F.2d at 106-07.
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with direct knowledge of the prior acts. 49
The third element is that the issue to which the evidence will be
applied must be disputed by the defendant. Generally, intent is consid-
ered to be in dispute whenever a plea of not guilty is entered.5 0  This
criterion was clearly met in all three cases inasmuch as Wormick vigor-
ously disputed intentionally falsifying the accident reports, 51 Dr. Stump
denied intentionally writing unlawful prescriptions,5 2 and Kane denied
any intentional involvement with drug dealing.5 3
The fourth element is that the probative value of the evidence must
outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice. This is, of course, the balancing
test of Rule 403. The court sidestepped this issue in Wormick by stating
that the application of the balancing test is left to the discretion of the
trial judge.54  Since the record disclosed that the judge considered the
competing interests, there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the
prior acts evidence. In Stump, the court found the probative value of the
prior acts evidence to be very high because "it tended to prove that the
defendant was engaged in a pattern of continuing unlawful conduct
outside the scope of a legitimate medical practice" which outweighed
"any conceivable prejudice to the defendant. '5 5 The court was forced to
examine the probative value of the prior acts evidence in Kane in more
detail. According to the court, the facts of the charged crime revealed
evidence of Kane's involvement in the cocaine sale, but there was a dis-
tinct lack of evidence that he was the actual supplier.56 Since there was
no accomplice testimony or other evidence of Kane's knowledge or in-
tent, the disputed evidence was needed by the prosecution to sustain its
burden of proof. Consequently, the court held that the probative value of
the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice because of the
49. See supra text accompanying note 27. The evidence of the falsified shooting report in
Wormick was provided by the testimony of the veteran police lieutenant who investigated the inci-
dent. 709 F.2d at 459. In Stump, the direct testimony came from one of the recipients of the pre-
scriptions as well as the prescription slips themselves. 735 F.2d at 275. Finally, the evidence in
Kane was provided by the testimony of the government agent to whom the defendant made his
admissions. 726 F.2d at 348.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 912 (1981) ("Faced with a plea of not guilty, the prosecution is under no obligation to wait and
see whether the defendant argues the non-existence of an element of crime before the prosecution
presents evidence establishing that element."); United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 383 (5th Cir.
1980) ("Evidence of such extrinsic offenses as may be probative of a defendant's state of mind is
admissible unless he 'affirmatively takes the issue of intent out of the case' " (citation omitted)).
51. Wormick, 709 F.2d at 459.
52. Stump, 735 F.2d at 275.
53. Kane, 726 F.2d at 348.
54. Wormick, 709 F.2d at 459.
55. Stump, 735 F.2d at 275.
56. Kane, 726 F.2d at 348.
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lack of any other evidence necessary to prove an essential element of the
crime.5 7
Explanation and Background
The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Jordan58 illus-
trates a situation where evidence of a prior bad act was admitted to ex-
plain or provide background for the charged crime. In this case, the
defendant was charged and convicted of aggravated battery and resisting
a peace officer arising out of his efforts to avoid arrest by security officers
at an Air Force base. In an incident a month earlier, the defendant had
been barred from the base for threatening security officers. On appeal,
the defendant argued that direct and indirect references to the debarment
incident violated rule 404(b) and denied him a fair trial.
The indirect references consisted of vague and unspecific comments
by the prosecutor concerning the prior debarment and were made to ex-
plain Jordan's presence on the base at the time of the charged crime. 59
The court observed that in balancing the probative value against the prej-
udicial impact, other circuits have admitted evidence of prior bad acts in
cases where the acts either explained the circumstances of the crime
charged, 60 provided background of the crime charged, 61 or completed
the story of the crime charged.62 Since the comments about the earlier
incident merely provided background information on the charged crime,
the court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying
Jordan's motion for a mistrial.63
The direct references came on direct examination of a witness where
the prosecutor attempted to elicit detailed information about the prior
debarment over the defendant's consistent objections. The trial judge
sustained the objections but would not grant defendant's motion for a
57. Id. (citing Dolliole, 597 F.2d at 106, where the court said:
Cases in this and other circuits, . . . indicate the usefulness of assessing the government's
need for the evidence. (citation omitted). When the government has ample evidence to
establish an element of the crime, the [incremental] probative value of the prior crime
evidence is greatly reduced, and the risk of prejudice which accompanies the admission of
such evidence will not be justified.
For a discussion of the dangers of the "necessity test" see Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial:
Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 771-73 (1961).
58. 722 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1983).
59. The base Commander had given permission for Jordan to return to the base to attend a
meeting on lifting his debarment. Id. at 356 n.1.
60. Id. at 356. See, e.g., Buatte v. United States, 350 F.2d 389, 395 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 856 (1966).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1091 (1977).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 578 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1978).
63. Jordan, 722 F.2d at 357.
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mistrial. He chose instead to promptly instruct the jury to disregard the
testimony about the prior incident. The Seventh Circuit held that
although the direct references to Jordan's prior bad acts were improper
under Rule 404(b), there was no reversible error considering the trial
court's prompt cautionary instruction and the overwhelming evidence of
guilt.64
Knowledge
The most important case involving Rule 404(b) to be decided by the
Seventh Circuit last year was United States v. Falco.65 In this case, the
defendant was charged with possession of stolen goods shipped in inter-
state commerce. Knowledge that the goods were stolen is an essential
element of the crime and was the only issue in dispute at trial. The de-
fendant presented evidence tending to prove that he came into possession
of the goods through the ordinary course of his employment without any
knowledge that they were stolen. The district court allowed the govern-
ment to enter evidence of the defendant's four prior interstate theft con-
victions, two of which occurred in 1952, one in 1962, and the other in
1978. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of the prior
convictions as violations of Rules 404(b) and 403.
The defendant's first argument was that the mere fact that he had
previously been convicted of crimes requiring knowledge of stolen goods
was not relevant to knowledge in this case unless the underlying facts of
the prior convictions were similar to the facts in the charged crime. In
rejecting this argument, the court deftly sidestepped precedent cases re-
quiring similarity of prior acts as a necessary element of relevancy66 by
distinguishing Falco on the basis that only the bare convictions were ad-
mitted, not the underlying facts. 67 This made the case one of first im-
64. Id. The court's instructions were "[a]s to specific incidents, [Jordan] is only on trial for
resisting these particular military policemen and for the charge of aggravated battery. . . . The jury
understands it is only the charges against Mr. Jordan that he is being tried for, not for something else
that happened." Id. Such cautionary or limiting instructions have long been considered important
in lessening the prejudicial impact of prior crimes evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 625
F.2d 782, 801 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 88 (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 859 (1980). However, blind
reliance on limiting instructions has come under increasing criticism, and it may be more realistic to
believe that the jury will be incapable of considering the evidence solely for the purpose offered. See
United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Bettencourt, 614 F.2d
214, 218 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bell, 500 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (2d Cir. 1974). See also
Comment, Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence: The Need for a Two-Step Analysis, 71 Nw. U.L.
REv. 634, 643 (1976).
65. 727 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1984).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Wormick, 709 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Feinberg, 535 F.2d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976).
67. Falco, 727 F.2d at 663.
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pression in the circuit. In the court's opinion, the prior convictions for
crimes which all required knowledge as an element tended to show that
Falco was familiar with transactions in stolen merchandise. The prior
convictions were therefore probative to the extent that they suggested
Falco would recognize the characteristics of a shipment of stolen goods
and know that the goods in the charged crime were stolen. Other crimi-
nal transactions are relevant if they have "a tendency to make the exist-
ence of an element of the crime more probable than it would be without
such evidence."' 68 Consequently, the court found that the evidence met
the minimal requirement of relevancy. 69
The court similarly rejected the argument that the age of the prior
convictions made them too stale to be of any probative value. Again
agreeing with the reasoning of the district court, the Seventh Circuit
stated that it was the pattern of the convictions over several years that
was important in this case, not the age of any one of the convictions. It
was the pattern of conduct which, according to the court, tended to es-
tablish the defendant's familiarity with transactions in stolen goods and
provided the probative value to the evidence. 70
In analyzing whether the trial judge abused her discretion in admit-
ting the evidence of the prior convictions under rule 403, the Seventh
Circuit relied on familiar theories. First, proof of knowledge was an es-
sential element of the crime, and the government had very little other
evidence to present on this issue. The amount of available corroborative
evidence is a proper consideration in the balancing exercise. 71 Second, an
attempt was made by the trial court to minimize the potential prejudicial
impact of the prior convictions by the use of a cautionary instruction to
the effect that the prior convictions should only be considered on the
issue of the defendant's knowledge. 72 Finally, the court noted that the
trial judge has wide discretion in undertaking the balancing required by
Rule 403 which should not be disturbed unless clearly abused. Thus, the
appellate court held that the admission of the prior convictions was not
an abuse of the trial court's discretion.73
Falco is a case which apparently could have gone either way. The
court pointed out that the trial judge would also have been justified in
68. Id. at 663-64 (quoting United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 665.
71. Id. (citing Dolliole, 597 F.2d at 106). See supra note 57.
72. 727 F.2d at 666. See supra text accompanying note 64.
73. Id. at 666-67.
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excluding the evidence of the prior convictions. 74 This decision thus ex-
emplifies the usual reluctance of appellate courts to interfere with the
discretion of the trial judge in determining whether to admit or exclude
evidence of prior crimes.
7
"
Although the Seventh Circuit can certainly point to many precedent
cases where the admissible prior crimes evidence had just as little connec-
tion to the charged crime, 76 there are also recent decisions to the con-
trary which just as easily could have been followed. 77 Judge Cudahy
noted in his thoughtful dissent that the tendency for over-reliance on
legal precedent may have resulted in a failure to logically analyze the
prior crimes evidence. 78 In his opinion, the underlying factual circum-
stances in the four prior convictions were crucial in determining whether
the evidence was relevant to proving knowledge in the charged crime.
Considering the numerous different factual circumstances which could
arise in any episode of transporting stolen goods, unless the facts of the
prior convictions are similar to the facts in the charged crime, knowledge
of stolen goods may not necessarily be inferred from the bare conviction
records.79  Moreover, the danger in using the four prior convictions to
establish a pattern of conduct is the potential for inferential error by the
jury. 80 Although the trial court's cautionary instruction to the jury was
intended to minimize this danger, these instructions are not always effec-
tive.8 1 In view of the obvious risk of unfair prejudice due to the repeti-
74. Id.
75. To the Seventh Circuit's credit, it went to considerable length in this case to analyze the
district court's reasoning. This has not always been the case with appellate courts which seem to be
all too willing to accept the trial court's judgment in these cases with little or no comment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Longoria, 624 F.2d 66, 68 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 (1980) (admission of
prior crimes evidence affirmed without discussion based on deference to trial court's discretion);
United States v. D'Alora, 585 F.2d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 1978) (appellate court only mentions balancing
test, then relies on trial court's discretion); United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 49 (5th Cir. 1978)
(appellate court assumes trial court determined that probative value outweighed unfair prejudice).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 1982) (prior charge of
hashish possession five years earlier was admissible to prove knowledge that a suitcase contained
heroin); United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir. 1980) (prior conviction in 1972 of
purchasing airline tickets with fraudulent credit cards was admissible to prove knowledge that tick-
ets sold by defendant in this case were purchased with stolen credit cards).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (the mere fact that
defendant was in the company of one who possessed drugs was inadmissible to prove knowledge in
drug possession charge two and one half years later); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 203-
04 (10th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (two prior convictions for the interstate transportation of stolen vehi-
cles were not admissible to prove defendant's knowledge that the vehicle he was charged with trans-
porting was stolen).
78. Falco, 727 F.2d at 668.
79. Id. at 667. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
80. "The danger is that once the jury is told of the defendant's other crimes, the jury will
impermissibly infer that he is a bad man likely to have committed the crime for which he is being
tried." United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (2d Cir. 1978).
81. "Giving the instruction may lessen but does not invariably eliminate the risk of prejudice
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tion of similar conduct, it is certainly questionable whether there was a
proper balancing of Rule 403 considerations in Falco.
Summary
The cases decided by the Seventh Circuit during the last term
clearly indicate that the court still considers Rules 403 and 404 to be
rules of inclusion. As is seen in the cases of Gutman, Kane, Jordan, and
Falco, wide latitude is given to the discretion of the trial court in weigh-
ing the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair preju-
dice. The decisions in Kane and Falco are also good examples of the
inferential lengths to which the Seventh Circuit is willing to go in ac-
cepting the admission of prior crimes evidence, particularly where the
government has little else with which to prove an essential element of the
crime. If there is a danger of inferential error by the jury which might
lead them to convict because the defendant is a "bad person," it appears
this danger can be satisfactorily ameliorated by the proper cautionary
instruction. In sum, the Seventh Circuit has continued its trend of liber-
ally allowing the admission of prior bad acts in criminal cases, with the
decision in Falco perhaps going farther in this direction than any previ-
ous decision.
RULE 501: PRIVILEGE
It now is generally accepted that in rejecting the nine specific rules
on privilege originally submitted by the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee, "Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze
the law of privilege."'8 2 By enacting the general language of Rule 50 1,83
Congress left the door open to change and provided the courts with "the
flexibility to develop the rules of privilege on a case by case basis". 8 4
During the 1983-84 term, the Seventh Circuit took advantage of this flex-
ibility to decide three cases dealing with privilege. Their decisions in two
of these cases modified existing privileges, and the decision in the third
case created a new privilege not previously recognized in the circuit.
notwithstanding the instruction. Rule 403 balancing must therefore take into account the likelihood
that the limiting instruction will be observed." United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir.
1980).
82. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
83. FED. R. EVID. 501 provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
84. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47.
EVIDENCE
Husband- Wife
The court, in United States v. Clark, 5 reaffirmed the joint participa-
tion exception to the common law spousal privilege. In Clark, the de-
fendant and his wife were indicted for stealing money from a savings and
loan association where he was employed. Clark was tried first and con-
victed in a bench trial. After the jury failed to reach a verdict in the
wife's first trial, the prosecution subpoenaed Clark to testify as a hostile
witness, believing that the incredibility of his testimony would sway the
second jury. Invoking the right of a witness-spouse not to testify ad-
versely against his accused spouse,8 6 Clark refused to testify. The district
court found that the privilege did not apply and held Clark in criminal
contempt.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court for two rea-
sons. First, the court held that the spousal privilege was limited to only
those situations where a spouse was neither a victim nor a participant.8 7
If this were not so, a criminal would be assured that the aid of a spouse
could be enlisted for a criminal purpose without fear of creating a poten-
tial witness. The public interest in discouraging such activity outweighs
the interest in protecting the marriage. Furthermore, two other circuits
have adopted similar exceptions to the marital privilege against one
spouse testifying as to the confidential communications of the other.88
Second, the court held that the privilege did not apply because the crime
took place prior to the marriage. 89 Although this exception was created
to discourage sham and collusive marriages entered into for the purpose
of suppressing testimony, it is not limited to this purpose. Application of
the exception generally to all cases makes it unnecessary for courts to
hold mini-trials to determine the true reasons for a marriage. 90
The decision in Clark is consistent with the general principle that
85. 712 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983).
86. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53, where the Supreme Court modified the spousal privilege rule
"so that the witness spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely" against the accused
spouse.
87. Clark, 712 F.2d at 301 (citing United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974), where the court created the joint participants exception to spousal
privilege).
88. See United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1379-81 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 906
(1976); United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 712-13 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906
(1976); But see Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1980).
89. Clark, 712 F.2d at 302. Again, the court relied on Van Drunen where it had previously
created the premarriage acts exception to spousal privilege. 501 F.2d at 397. Two other circuits also
have recognized the premarriage acts exception for the related marital privilege of confidential com-
munications. United States v. Pensinger, 549 F.2d 1150, 1151 (8th Cir. 1977); Voliantis v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Servs., 352 F.2d 766, 768 (9th Cir. 1965).
90. Clark, 712 F.2d at 302.
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privileges are obstructions to truth and should be narrowly construed. 91
The spousal privilege in particular has come under increasing criticism in
recent years since the original reasons for its existence are largely outmo-
ded in today's society. 92 In this regard, the Seventh Circuit has always
been in the judicial vanguard of those limiting the scope of the spousal
privilege. 93
Attorney-Client
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,94 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the trustee in bankruptcy of a corporate debtor
does not have the power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privi-
lege as to any communications occurring prior to the date the petition
was filed. 95 In this case, the Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers, Inc.
(CDCB) came under investigation of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (Commission) for alleged violations of the Commodity Ex-
change Act. At the same time, CDCB also filed a petition for bank-
ruptcy, and a trustee was appointed. In furtherance of its investigation,
the Commission served an administrative subpoena duces tecum upon
the respondent who had formerly represented CDCB as one of its attor-
neys. Weintraub appeared for his deposition but refused to answer cer-
tain questions, asserting the attorney-client privilege. The trustee in
bankruptcy then waived the attorney-client privilege, but Weintraub still
refused to answer the questions. An order by the Magistrate compelling
Weintraub to answer was upheld by the district court. The only question
on appeal was whether the trustee in bankruptcy had the power to waive
the corporate attorney-client privilege. 96
Although this question had not previously been considered by the
Seventh Circuit, the Second and Eighth Circuits have recently addressed
the issue. Both of these courts held that the trustee in bankruptcy had
91. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228,
at 221 (McNaughton rev. 1961); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 79, at 165 (Cleary ed. 1972).
92. The roots of this privilege sprang from medieval jurisprudence where the wife and husband
were considered to be one person but finds little support in modern marriages characterized by
independence and complete political and legal equality of the spouses. See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S.
at 43-45; MCCORMICK, supra note 91, § 66, at 145-46.
93. See United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396-97 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1091 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194-95 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973) (cross petition raising marital privilege issue), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974);
United States v. Doughty, 460 F.2d 1360, 1363-64 (7th Cir. 1972).
94. 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 321 (1984).
95. Id. at 342.
96. Id. at 340. There is little question that the corporate attorney-client privilege survives the
corporation's entry into bankruptcy. See People's Bank of Buffalo v. Brown, 112 F. 652, 654 (3rd
Cir. 1902).
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the power to waive the attorney-client privilege. In In re O.P.M. Leasing
Services, Inc. ,97 soon after a computer leasing company filed a voluntary
petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, it was charged with fraud by several creditors, and the of-
ficers and directors resigned. During the ensuing investigation by the
U.S. Attorney, the trustee in bankruptcy waived the attorney-client privi-
lege in regards to a subpoena ducus tecum served on a former corporate
attorney. The court upheld the waiver in these circumstances because
the power to make such a decision adheres to the trustee by virtue of the
nonexistence of any other entity (corporate officer or director) authorized
to so act.98 The Seventh Circuit was able to distinguish the facts in
O.P.M. Leasing because some of CDCB's officers and directors remained
in office and thus were able to exercise the right to invoke or waive the
attorney-client privilege on behalf of the corporation.99
In Citibank, N.A. v. Andros,1°° the principal secured creditor of
three bankrupt corporations attempted to obtain an order compelling
production of certain documents from a former corporate legal advisor.
Officers of the bankrupt corporation successfully opposed the order by
invoking the attorney-client privilege, but the trustee in bankruptcy
claimed the right to waive the privilege and appealed. The Eighth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the attorney-client privilege belonged to the corpora-
tion, and the power to assert or waive it thus rested with management,
not the individual officers. Under the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee as-
sumed broad management powers. Because the power to assert or waive
the privilege belonged to management, the court held that it passed to
the trustee with the property of the corporate debtor.10' The Seventh
Circuit admitted the factual similarity between the two cases but criti-
cized the Eighth Circuit for not discussing the policy of full disclosure
underlying the attorney-client privilege or explaining why the attorney-
client privilege for a corporation should be treated differently in bank-
ruptcy than the attorney-client privilege of an individual. Ultimately, the
Seventh Circuit simply rejected the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the
attorney-client privilege was a form of property that passed automati-
cally to the trustee upon bankruptcy. 10 2 Furthermore, the court did not
find that the CDCB specifically relinquished control of the attorney-cli-
97. 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982).
98. Id. at 386-87.
99. Commodity Futures, 722 F.2d at 341.
100. 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).
101. Id. at 1195.
102. Commodity Futures, 722 F.2d at 342. The court also criticized the Eighth Circuit for rely-
ing on an unpublished slip opinion from a district court in another circuit (In re Continental Mort-
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ent privilege in the documents transferring corporate assets to the
trustees.1
0 3
The Seventh Circuit articulated four reasons for its holding in this
case. First, even in bankruptcy the corporation continues to exist until
dissolved by its shareholders or by the state. Although the trustee has
broad powers to manage the corporation's property and assets, he does
not acquire absolute authority over all corporate functions and legal
rights. 04 Second, an individual in bankruptcy is also subject to public
examination by the trustee, but the trustee cannot waive the attorney-
client privilege for the individual. 0 5 There is no reason for a debtor cor-
poration to have less protection. Third, allowing the trustee to waive the
attorney-client privilege discriminates against the corporation solely on
the basis of economic status. 0 6 Fourth, allowing the trustee to waive the
attorney-client privilege would have a "chilling effect" on communica-
tions between attorneys and their corporate clients which would inhibit
the free exchange of ideas so necessary to effective legal representation. 107
Thus, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion of every other
court which has considered the issue.10 8
Academic Freedom
The Seventh Circuit recognized for the first time in Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac'0 9 a
qualified academic freedom privilege to protect from disclosure the iden-
tities of academicians participating in the faculty peer review process. 110
In this case, a black professor alleged that the University had unlawfully
discriminated against him on the basis of race in denying him a tenured
gage Investors, No. 79-593-S slip op. at 2 (D. Mass. July 31, 1979)) as the only authority for its
conclusion.
103. 722 F.2d at 341.
104. Id. at 342.
105. Id. (citing In re Blier Cedar Co., 10 B.R. 993 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); 2 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, 343.12 (15th ed. 1982)).
106. 722 F.2d at 343.
107. Id.
108. See In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs. Inc., 670 F.2d 383, 387 (2d Cir. 1982) (power to waive
attorney-client privilege vests with trustee in absence of corporate officers or directors); Citibank,
N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981) (power to waive attorney-client privilege passes
with corporate property to the trustee in bankruptcy); In re Blier Cedar Co., 10 B.R. 993 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1981) (power to waive attorney-client privilege passes to the trustee in bankruptcy); In re
Amjoe, Inc., 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 45 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (order of bankruptcy adjudication
divests officers of the power to invoke the attorney-client privilege and vests it in the trustee by
operation of law); Weck v. District Court, 161 Colo. 384, 422 P.2d 46 (1967) (trustee in bankruptcy
has power to waive statutory accountant-client privilege).
109. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
110. Id. at 337.
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position in the Economics Department. He filed a complaint with the
EEOC, and as part of its investigation the EEOC demanded that the
University furnish copies of the personnel records of the professor. The
University offered to allow an investigator to view the personnel file, but
refused to permit the EEOC to make copies because the file contained so
much confidential material. In response, the EEOC demanded the per-
sonnel records of the entire Economics Department. The University of-
fered to produce the records if the EEOC would sign an agreement
requiring them to protect the confidentiality of the material. The EEOC
refused and issued an administrative subpoena duces tecum for the
records. When the University refused to comply, the EEOC applied to
the district court for an order to show cause why the subpoena should
not be enforced. The district court ruled for the EEOC, and the Univer-
sity appealed.
The University contended that the personnel files contained peer re-
view evaluations which were protected by a qualified academic privilege
since the evaluations were made with the assurance and expectation of
confidentiality. It asked to be permitted to delete the names and other
identifying information of the faculty members participating in the peer
review process.II' The University also argued that the EEOC should be
required to sign a non-disclosure agreement as a condition precedent to
obtaining the files.11 2
The Seventh Circuit was faced with significant and substantial com-
peting interests in this case. On the one hand, the importance of main-
taining academic freedom as a special concern of the first amendment has
been ardently expressed by the Supreme Court." 3 The peer review pro-
cess has evolved as a reliable method of making tenure decisions based on
an objective and frank critique of the candidate's academic qualifications.
Confidentiality is essential to the peer review process, and disclosure of
secret tenure ballots and evaluations could have a "chilling effect" on the
participants' willingness to be candid.1 1 4
On the other hand, even first amendment interests are not absolute
and may be overcome by compelling countervailing interests. 1 5 A com-
Ill. Id. at 334.
112. Id.
113. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). See also Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
114. Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904
(1977); McKillop v. Regents of Univ. of California, 386 F. Supp. 1270, 1276 (N.D. Cal. 1975); cf
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (a denial of confidentiality among high government
officials would temper their candor).
115. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-17 (1977).
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plete academic freedom privilege could be used as a shield to overcome
charges of discrimination and frustrate the national goal of ending dis-
crimination.1 6 Thus, a claim of academic freedom should yield when
necessary for the vindication of a person's constitutional rights.1t7
The court weighed these competing interests and found the balance
tipped in favor of academic freedom."" Consequently, the University
was allowed to delete names and identifying information from the
records before producing them. The district court was ordered to review
both the edited records and the unedited records in camera to determine
whether the deletions were reasonably necessary to conceal the identity
of the evaluating academicians. If so, the edited files would be given to
the EEOC. However, the privilege was only qualified and would give
way upon a showing that the tenure decision was not made for legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons.' 19 For disclosure of the deleted por-
tions of the records, the EEOC would be required to show a
"particularized need"'120 for the additional material, and the district
court would be obliged to conduct a balancing test to determine whether
the need for disclosure outweighed the adverse effects. "Exploratory"
searches would not be condoned, and the court foresaw very few circum-
stances in which it would be necessary to release the identities of the peer
reviewers. The court also held that the EEOC did not have to sign a
non-disclosure agreement to obtain the records but instructed the district
court to issue a protective order insuring the confidentiality of the edited
records.12 In the court's view, these procedures struck the proper bal-
ance between the competing interests.
The Seventh Circuit thus joins the Second Circuit as the only two
federal circuits to recognize a qualified academic freedom privilege. The
privilege outlined by the Seventh Circuit however is broader than the
privilege established by the Second Circuit in Gray v. Board of Higher
Education, City of New York.' 22 According to that case, the qualified
116. Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 337.
117. See, e.g., Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., City of New York, 692 F.2d 901, 908 (2d Cit.
1982) (the plaintiff's need for information to prove racial discrimination was greater than the col-
lege's need for confidentiality); Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1980) (produc-
tion of confidential information allowed faculty member to prove sex discrimination in promotion
practices).
118. Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 337.
119. Id. at 338.
120. The "particularized need" standard varies in proportion to the degree of access to other
sources of information; thorough and exhaustive discovery to fully exploit all other information
must be conducted; and a compelling necessity for the specific information must be demonstrated.
Id.
121. Id. at 339.
122. 697 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
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privilege should be recognized only if the faculty member is first pro-
vided with a detailed statement of the reasons for an adverse decision.123
The Fourth Circuit fell short of recognizing the privilege in Keyes v. Le-
noir Rhyne College,' 24 where it held that a district court order protecting
the confidentiality of faculty evaluations was valid under Rule 26(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Fifth Circuit rejected an aca-
demic freedom privilege in In re Dinnan,125 stating that such a privilege
would simply encourage discrimination of all types at institutions of
higher learning. 126
RULE 801(d)(2)(E): CO-CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) t 27 provides that a statement 28 of one co-conspir-
ator is admissible against any other co-conspirator as a non-hearsay1 29
admission if made during the course and in furtherance of the conspir-
acy. Although the co-conspirator exception is stated simply enough in
its codified form, the language of the rule conspicuously leaves open a
number of issues which have complicated its administration. For exam-
ple, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is silent on the respective roles of the judge and
jury in determining whether a conspiracy exists and the exception ap-
plies.1 30  Rule 801(d)(2)(E) similarly fails to delineate the standard of
proof necessary to satisfy its foundational requirements or indicate
whether the proponent must adduce evidence independent of the prof-
fered statement to discharge the appropriate standard of proof. 131
123. Id. at 908.
124. 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
125. 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
126. Id. at 431.
127. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides: "A statement is not hearsay if... [tihe statement is
offered against a party and is. . .a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course of and
in furtherance of the conspiracy."
128. FED. R. EvID. 801(a) defines a "statement" as (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonver-
bal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion."
129. FED. R. EvID. 802 reads: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Con-
gress." See infra note 177. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules, co-conspirator statements
were admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
Although Rule 801(d)(2)(E) now classifies evidence of an admissible co-conspirator statement as
non-hearsay rather than as an exception to the hearsay rule, this is a distinction with only a semantic
difference. United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1231 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978).
130. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
131. Id. For an excellent discussion of the administrative and procedural issues surrounding the
co-conspirator exception, see Mueller, The Federal Co-conspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and
Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 363-87 (1984). See also Note, Inconsistencies in the Federal
Circuit Courts' Application of the Co-conspirator Exception, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 125 (1982);
Note, Co-Conspirator Declarations: Procedure and Standard of Proof or Admission Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 577 (1979).
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In 1978, in United States v. Santiago,132 the Seventh Circuit care-
fully considered these issues and set forth the circuit's standard for the
admission of co-conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Under
the Santiago standard, a statement is admissible as a co-conspirator dec-
laration when the trial judge1 33 is satisfied that the proponent of the
statement has proven by a preponderance of the evidence, 134 independent
of the statement itself:' 35 (1) that a conspiracy existed, 36 (2) that the
132. 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978).
133. In Santiago, the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 104(a) requires the trial judge alone to
determine the admissibility of co-conspirator statements. Id. at 1133. The Seventh Circuit's position
is consistent with the current consensus among the other circuits that the trial judge is solely respon-
sible for deciding whether to admit the co-conspirator statements. See United States v. Jackson, 627
F.2d 1198, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 966 (10th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 984-85 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040,
1043 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1298 (2d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 627 (3d Cir.
1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
134. 582 F.2d at 1134. Eight other circuits apply the preponderance of evidence standard of
proof. See United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1327 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
905 (1980); United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917
(1979); United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 986 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d
1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1299 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d
623, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); United States v. Jones,
542 F.2d 186, 202-03 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976). Only the Ninth Circuit applies
the less burdensome prima facie standard of proof. United States v. Batimana, 623 F.2d 1366, 1368
(9th Cir.) cert. denied, 443 U.S. 1038 (1980), ("substantial evidence apart from the statements which
establishes a prima facie case of conspiracy and the defendant's slight connection to the conspir-
acy.") The prima facie standard has been criticized by one commentator on the ground that it
affords the criminal defendant little protection. Saltzberg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Ques-
tions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271, 303-04 (1975).
Although none of the circuits have adopted a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof for
the admission of co-conspirator statements, one commentator asserts that the more onerous standard
of proof is necessary to protect alleged criminal co-conspirators. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, T 104[05] at 104-44 (1982). But see S. SALTZBERG & K. REDDEN, FED-
ERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 466-67 (2d ed. 1977) (reasonable doubt standard would allow
the possibility of bootstrapping). In Santiago, the Seventh Circuit found that there was "no reason
to require that [the existence of a] conspiracy be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. That is the
standard the jury will apply to the evidence as a whole. The judge is ruling on admissibility, not
guilt or innocence; the government's burden need not be so great." 582 F.2d at 1134 (quoting
United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977)).
135. 582 F.2d at 1133. See also United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 1983)
(evidence used "to establish the conspiracy must be non-hearsay and independent of the statements
the government wishes to have admitted"); United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 684 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1357 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
The requirement that a conspiracy be shown by independent, non-hearsay evidence finds its
origin in the pre-Rules decision of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). In Glasser, the
Supreme Court held that the independent evidence requirement was necessary, "[o]therwise, hearsay
would lift itself by its bootstraps to the level of competent evidence." Id. at 74-75. A majority of
circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, continue to adhere to the Glasser independent evidence re-
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defendants and the declarant were members of the conspiracy, 37 and
(3) that the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy. 138
The great value and utility of the co-conspirator exception in federal
practice is perhaps best reflected by the fact that, judging from reported
cases, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is easily the single most cited provision of Arti-
cle VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 39 This observation remained
true for the Seventh Circuit during its 1983-84 term.140 The court's most
comprehensive decision of this last term involving Rule 801(d)(2)(E) was
United States v. Coe.14 1 In Coe, as part of a plea arrangement, an admit-
ted drug dealer named Klinefelter had agreed to help law enforcement
officials in narcotics investigations. In the first of a series of nineteen
taped telephone conversations, Klinefelter contacted defendant Coe and
offered to sell him a large amount of marijuana. In the last taped conver-
sation on April 15, 1982, Coe told Klinefelter that he had finally found
quirement. See, e.g., United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 852 (1978). The First and Sixth Circuits have relied upon Rule 104(a), which provides that a
trial judge "is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges" when
deciding preliminary questions of admissibility, to hold that the trial judge may consider the co-
conspirator statement itself in determining its admissibility. FED. R. EvID. 104(a); United States v.
Guerro, 693 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
136. Although Rule 801(d)(2)(E) does not expressly require proof that a conspiracy existed, "the
existence of a conspiracy is an obvious precondition before the Rule comes into play." United States
v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 547 (7th Cir. 1979).
137. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish membership in a conspiracy. Ham-
ling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974); United States v. Coe, 718 F.2d 830, 837 (7th Cir.
1983).
138. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). The "during the course" and "in furtherance" requirements
are closely linked. The purpose of the "in futherance" requirement is "to protect the accused against
idle chatter of criminal partners as well as inadvertantly misreported and deliberately fabricated
evidence." 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(E)[01], 801-235
(1982).
139. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 427 at 331 (1980).
140. In addition to the cases discussed infra, the following cases may be of interest to the Sev-
enth Circuit practitioner: United States v. Radseck, 718 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1291 (1984) (despite an isolated reference to the prima facie standard, trial judge properly
applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in determining that a conspiracy existed as re-
quired under Santiago); United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 697 (7th Cir. 1983) (trial court's
conditional admission of co-conspirators' statements before a conspiracy had been established was
proper; co-conspirator statements may be admitted conditionally subject to the trial judge later de-
claring a mistrial or giving a cautionary instruction if conspiracy showing is not made); United
States v. Ras, 713 F.2d 311, 317 (7th Cir. 1983) (co-conspirator's testimony in great detail about his
dealings with defendant in furtherance of the conspiracy was not hearsay and provided ample basis
for admission as a co-conspirator statement under the Santiago standard); United States v. Samples,
713 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1983) (in a prosecution for aiding and abetting the receipt, sale, and
disposition of stolen goods and property, existence of a conspiracy had been shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence where coconspirator testified that a third party had given him defendant's name
and telephone number).
141. 718 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1983).
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someone with the necessary $12,000 in cash and was now ready to make
the deal. 142 They agreed to meet in the parking lot of a Denny's restau-
rant in Springfield, Illinois, at 5:00 p.m. that evening, Coe indicating that
his party would arrive in a white Chevelle.
When Coe and defendants Korenak and Joseph arrived at the park-
ing lot in a white Chevelle as planned, they were arrested by the police.
After being advised of his rights, Joseph, an auto mechanic once in the
employ of Korenak, made a statement to the effect that the three men
had driven from Kansas City, Missouri to Springfield for the purpose of
buying used cars to fix and sell for profit. 143 Several firearms and a bag
containing $12,000 in cash were discovered in the car. At a jury trial, all
of the defendants were found guilty of conspiring to possess marijuana
with the intent to distribute and various firearms offenses.144
On appeal, Joseph and Korenak contended that the trial court erred
in admitting tapes of the phone conversations between Coe and
Klinefelter under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as evidence against them. Specifi-
cally, they argued that the government had failed to establish by a pre-
ponderance of independent evidence all of the predicate facts for
admission of a co-conspirator statement under the Santiago standard. At
the threshold of its analysis, the Seventh Circuit posited that the co-con-
spirator exception is based upon the theory that members of a conspiracy
are partners in crime and thus each other's agents. 45 The court high-
142. Klinefelter had sold Coe 350 pounds of marijuana in July of 1981. The transcripts of the
telephone calls made before April 15, 1982, revealed that Coe was attempting, with little success, to
find persons to finance the drug deal. 718 F.2d at 833.
143. Joseph stated that he had brought the $12,000 in cash for this purpose and a loaded firearm
for security. He maintained that he did not know the person who was selling the cars, but that if
they had found any cars to buy he would have had to return to Kansas City to get a trailer to pick
them up. At trial, Coe and Korenak testified, corroborating Joseph's statement. Korenak testified
that Coe had telephoned to tell him about the cars for sale in Springfield, and that he in turn tele-
phoned Joseph and relayed the information. Coe testified that he had made up the whole used car
story to convince Joseph and Korenak to come to Springfield with the money. Coe testified that his
purpose in arranging this scheme was so that he could meet Klinefelter, show him the cash, and then
go with him alone to the place where he kept his supply of drugs, his money and other valuables.
There, Coe would try to collect on a debt owed to him by Klinefelter's brother-in-law, for which he
thought Klinefelter should be held partly responsible, or at least obtain information on the wherea-
bouts of the brother-in-law. Coe would then tell Joseph and Korenak, who were waiting at a motel
with the cash, that there were no cars to buy. He denied having bought marijuana from Klinefelter
on any prior occasion, and claimed that he had learned the drug slang that he used in his conversa-
tions with Klinefelter from some acquaintances who were involved with drugs. Id. at 833-34.
144. Id. at 834.
145. Id. at 835 (citing Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974)). In Anderson, the Court
explained that the rationale of the coconspirator exception was based upon concepts of agency law:
The rationale for both the hearsay-conspiracy exception and its limitations is the notion
that conspirators are partners in crime. As such, the law deems them agents of one an-
other. And just as the declarations of an agent bind the principal only when the agent acts
within the scope of his authority, so the declaration of a conspirator must be made in
furtherance of the conspiracy charged in order to be admissible against his partner.
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lighted the important distinction between the evidentiary concept of con-
spiracy, and the substantive crime of conspiracy, which requires much
more than a mere joint venture or concerted action. 146 Because the evi-
dentiary and criminal concepts of conspiracy are not coterminous, 147 a
criminal conspiracy charge is not a prerequisite for invocation of the co-
conspirator exception. 48  The exception may be invoked in both civil
and criminal cases. 149
After laying this groundwork, the Seventh Circuit turned to the
merits of the case at hand. The court first addressed the defendants' con-
tention that the government had failed to prove by a preponderance of
independent evidence that a conspiracy existed. The Seventh Circuit
noted that the trial court had based its decision to admit the telephone
conversations largely on the fact that a white Chevelle carrying the de-
fendants and $12,000 in cash had arrived at the restaurant parking lot
exactly as predicted. Inasmuch as Coe's statements were themselves the
source of this prediction, the Seventh Circuit found that the trial court
had improperly considered the telephone conversations in determining
that the government had met its burden of proving that the defendants
had engaged in a joint venture. 50 However, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the trial court's error in considering the telephone conversa-
417 U.S. at 218 n.6 (citations omitted). See also Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d
Cir. 1926) ("When men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for
one another, and have made 'a partnership in crime.' "), cert. denied sub noma., Ackerson v. United
States, 273 U.S. 702 (1926).
It has been candidly suggested, however, that the real reason for the co-conspirator exception is
simply that there is a great need for it in criminal conspiracy prosecutions, which are inherently
difficult to prove. Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920,
989 (1959); Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy-A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1163-65, 1169 (1954). The Advisory Committee to the
Federal Rules of Evidence implicitly adopted this view when it stated, "The agency theory of con-
spiracy is at best a fiction". Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (1976). De-
spite the foregoing, the Seventh Circuit readily asserted in Coe that the rationale for the co-
conspirator exception is explained by principles of agency law. 718 F.2d at 835. The Seventh Cir-
cuit's revelation in Coe is a bit perplexing when viewed in light of its recent recognition that the co-
conspirator exception is in fact "largely a result of necessity, since it is most often invoked in crimi-
nal conspiracy cases in which the proof would otherwise be very difficult and the evidence largely
circumstantial." United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979).
146. 718 F.2d at 835. The substantive crime of conspiracy generally requires a meeting of the
minds, intent, and, where mandated by statute, an overt act. Gil, 604 F.2d at 549.
147. United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 130 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
148. Gil, 604 F.2d at 549. To help distinguish between the criminal and evidentiary concepts of
conspiracy, courts sometimes drop the term conspiracy and refer to the evidentiary concept as the
"joint venture" exception, e.g., United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1978), or the "concert of action" exception, e.g., United States v. Trowery, 542
F.2d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977).
149. See, e.g., Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1126, 1245 (7th Cir. 1982)
(civil antitrust suit). Thus, as the Seventh Circuit pointed out in Coe, it is not even necessary that the
joint venture itself be unlawful. 718 F.2d at 836 n.3.
150. 718 F.2d at 836.
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tions was harmless in light of the trial record which disclosed sufficient
independent evidence to establish these foundational facts' 5' and show
that Coe's statements, at least in part, 5 2 were made in the course and
furtherance of a joint venture to buy marijuana.
On appeal, Korenak also challenged the admission of Coe's state-
ments in the telephone calls made prior to the day of the arrest on the
grounds that: (1) there was no evidence that either he or Joseph were
members of a conspiracy before that point; and (2) the conspiracy itself
was not yet in existence. In rejecting the first claim, the Seventh Circuit
relied upon the "well-established principle that statements of co-conspir-
ators before a defendant joins the conspiracy are nonetheless admissible
against him."' 153 Turning to the second claim, the court found that inso-
far as "[t]he requirement that the statement be made 'during the course
of" the conspiracy seems itself to contemplate that the conspiracy be in
existence at the time the statement is made,"' 54 Coe's statements to
Klinefelter before the day of the arrest should not have been admitted
under the co-conspirator exception because they also were made before
the formation of the conspiracy. The court noted that transcripts of the
telephone calls before that date revealed that Coe had not yet found any-
one to finance the drug buy. Furthermore, Coe and Klinefelter were not
engaged in a joint venture; they were working at cross purposes, even
though Coe was unaware of this at the time.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the substance of
these statements was merely cumulative, adding nothing prejudicial to
Coe's statements to Klinefelter on the date of the defendants' arrest,
which were admissible under the conconspirator exception. 55  There-
fore, any error in their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
151. The Seventh Circuit found that there was sufficient evidence of a joint venture to purchase
marijuana in Springfield because, among other things, Klinefelter testified that he had contacted Coe
for the purpose of luring him to Springfield for the drug buy; the events surrounding another recent
drug deal between Klinefelter and Coe were similar to those leading up to the defendants' arrest; the
trip to Springfield was made immediately after the last of nineteen telephone calls; and the defend-
ants were in possession of a large amount of cash and three loaded firearms when they were arrested.
Id. at 837-38.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 154-55.
153. 718 F.2d at 838. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393 (1948)
("With the conspiracy thus fully established, the declarations and acts of the various members, even
though made or done prior to the adherence of some to the conspiracy, become admissible against all
as declarations or acts of co-conspirators in aid of the conspiracy."). See also United States v. Cass-
ity, 631 F.2d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1230 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976); United States v. Santos, 385 F.2d 43, 44-5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 954 (1968).
154. 718 F.2d at 840.
155. Id.
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doubt.' 56 Although no new trails were blazed in Coe, the decision re-
flects a tension between loosening the strictures of the Santiago standard
to allow wider admissibility of co-conspirator statements and the concern
with protecting the criminal defendant against the unfair prejudice of an
improperly admitted co-conspirator statement.
The Seventh Circuit decided two other cases during this last term
which indicate that the court favors a flexible application of the founda-
tional requirements for admission of a co-conspirator statement under
the Santiago standard. In United States v. Xheka,15 7 the defendants were
convicted of conspiracy to destroy their downtown restaurant as part of a
scheme to collect the proceeds from an insurance policy taken out on the
restaurant. The evidence presented at trial showed that in July of 1976
Chris Callas had told Wadie Howard, a known arsonist, that the defend-
ants had a problem which Howard could probably solve. Although Cal-
las, a mutual acquaintance of the defendants and Howard, did not tell
Howard what the nature of this problem was, he did ask Howard to pass
along some money if he was remunerated for his services. Two days
later, Howard met with the defendants and agreed to burn down the
restaurant for $5,000 in cash plus expenses. Three more weeks passed,
and after receiving the money in advance as promised, Howard set a fire
that destroyed the restaurant. The scheme backfired, however, because
two eyewitnesses at the scene of the crime saw Howard leave the restau-
rant just moments before it was leveled by an explosion.
After his arrest, Howard decided to cooperate with the govern-
ment's investigation of the fire. A suit which the defendants had filed
against their insurance company, seeking payment of the insurance pro-
ceeds, was pending at the time of the trial. At trial, the government was
allowed to introduce a tape recording of a conversation that took place in
July of 1979 between Callas and Howard, who was now a government
informant. The crux of the conversation, which was admitted as sub-
stantive evidence under the co-conspirator exception, was that Callas
thought that the defendants should work with Howard so that they could
collect the insurance proceeds.1 58
On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in admit-
ting the tape because (1) the conspiracy had ended as soon as the fire was
156. Cf United States v. Miller, 725 F.2d 462, 467 (8th Cir. 1981) (trial court's error in admis-
sion of a statement under the co-conspirator exception which was not made during the course or in
furtherance of the conspiracy was harmless where the statement was cumulative in nature and not
essential to the government's case).
157. 704 F.2d 974 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 486 (1983).
158. The Seventh Circuit set out the following excerpt from the taped conversation:
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set, and (2) Callas was not a member of any conspiracy at the time of the
conversation. Recognizing that "an agreement to conceal a completed
crime does not extend the life of a conspiracy,"' 59 the Seventh Circuit
indicated that it will follow the teachings of United States v. Grune-
wald, t60 where the Supreme Court found that "a vital distinction must be
made between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main crim-
inal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after
these central objectives have been obtained."' 6' Citing the analogous sit-
uation where kidnappers conceal their crime and their victim while wait-
ing for a ransom payment, the court reasoned that the conspiracy did not
end once the restaurant was destroyed because the defendants were still
actively pursuing the unrealized main object of the conspiracy--ob-
taining the insurance payment.1 62
In rejecting the defendants' claim that there was insufficient evi-
dence to establish that Callas was a member of the conspiracy at the time
of the taped conversation, the Seventh Circuit underscored the fact that
Callas had sent Howard to the defendants and expected some money in
return. Furthermore, one of the defendants had made a brief telephone
call when Howard introduced himself at the restaurant. According to
the court, it was "a fair inference" that the call was to Callas to confirm
Howard's credentials. 163 The court concluded:
Once a member of the conspiracy Callas remained a conspirator until
he took affirmative steps to withdraw from the agreement. Even if
Howard: Have you got a quick minute where we can talk right quick? The Govern-
ment come back. I been trying to get in touch with Sonny [one of the defendants]. Have
you heard anything from him?
Callas: I heard he had a restaurant somewhere, I hear. Like I say, if you really want
to know, I can find out, I can find out for you.
Callas: . . . You know the worst thing that you ever did in life to me is introduce me
to this guy. This son-of-a-bitch.
Howard: What now? . . . They welch? . . . They should cooperate with you if they
want to get their money. They should cooperate with you. Then leave me your number
and I'm going to try to, for sure, I'm going to try to hard. I got this girl that's coming back
in a few weeks. She knows them.
Howard: Yes. I want to talk to 'em.
Callas: Do they get that money?
Howard: Yes, ah no. I don't, I don't think so yet. It's still pending.
Callas: Can they get the money without you?
Howard: I don't think so.
Callas: All right. I think, I think I'm gonna talk to this girl for sure.
704 F.2d at 984-85.
159. Id. at 985 (citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 405 (1957)).
160. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
161. Id. at 405.
162. 704 F.2d at 985-86.
163. Id. at 986.
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Callas did nothing to further the purpose of the conspiracy after he
sent Howard to see the defendants, and even if Callas had, understand-
ably, given up any hope of receiving money from Howard, he remained
a conspirator. "Mere cessation of activity in furtherance of the con-
spiracy does not constitute withdrawal."' 6 4
The Seventh Circuit also found that Callas's statements were in fur-
therance of the conspiracy because they showed that he was trying to
keep Howard in the conspiracy to aid the defendants' efforts in collecting
the insurance proceeds. 165 The court's finding is significant for two rea-
sons. First, it clarifies an ambiguous point about the "in furtherance"
requirement which the court had recently made in United States v.
Mackey. 166 In Mackey, the Seventh Circuit stated that the government
must demonstrate that "some reasonable basis exists for concluding that
the statements furthered the conspiracy."'' 67 The court's statement
would seem to suggest that a co-conspirator's statement must effectively
advance conspiratorial goals to satisfy the 'in furtherance' requirement.
However, this reading of Mackey was implicitly rejected by the Seventh
Circuit in Xheka. In Xheka, Callas's statements to Howard could not
have actually furthered the conspiracy because Howard was a govern-
ment informant at the time of their conversation. Xheka thus stands for
the proposition that, for purposes of the "in furtherance" requirement, it
is not necessary that a co-conspirator statement actually further the con-
spiracy; it is enough if the statement is uttered with the intent of further-
ing the conspiracy. 168
The Xheka decision is also important because it marks the first time
that the Seventh Circuit, or any other circuit court of appeals, has ac-
knowledged that the determination of whether a co-conspirator state-
ment is made in furtherance of the conspiracy "must of necessity take
into account the contents of the [proffered] statement."' 169 This practice,
applicable only to the "in furtherance" prong of the Santiago standard
after all of the other predicate facts for admission are established by in-
164. Id. (quoting United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1018 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1136 (1982)). See also United States v. Diaz, 662 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 988 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976).
165. See supra note 158.
166. 571 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
167. 571 F.2d at 388.
168. Cf United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1270 (6th Cir.) (trial court properly admitted
under the coconspirator exception statements made to a coconspirator who was cooperating with the
government because such statements need not actually further the conspiracy; "[it is enough that
they be intended to promote the conspiratorial objectives"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 753, 754 (1983).
169. 704 F.2d at 986.
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dependent evidence, 170 makes a good deal of sense. The court's ruling is
both logical and practical because the contents of the statement in issue
will, by their very nature, be important in determining whether the de-
clarant made it with the intent to further the conspiracy.' 7' For exam-
ple, the contents of the conversation in question in Xheka revealed that
although Callas had not communicated with the defendants recently, he
was nonetheless aware that Howard's cooperation was vital in obtaining
the insurance proceeds, and, to this end, had told Howard that he was
going to get in touch with the defendants. 172 The Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that this sufficed to establish that the conversation was made in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 173
This same theme found further expression in United States v. De
Gudino,1 74 where the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to trans-
port illegal aliens. On appeal, the principal issue in De Gudino was
whether certain lists containing evidence of the smuggling operation were
made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and were
thus admissible under the co-conspirator exception. The Seventh Circuit
noted that the contents of the lists consisted of names of smuggled aliens
and their sponsors, along with dates, telephone numbers, dollar figures,
and records of payment. From the contents of the lists, it was clear that
their author was familiar with the intricacies of the smuggling operation.
The Seventh Circuit found that the fact that the lists contained dates
and records of payment was sufficient evidence to establish that they
were written during the course of the conspiracy. The "in furtherance"
prong of the Santiago standard was also satisfied because the names, tele-
phone numbers, and dollar amounts were evidence that the lists were
used to preserve information which the defendants needed to continue
their smuggling activities. The Seventh Circuit concluded that "[s]ince
this evidence was not countered by any evidence that the lists were made
at any time other than during the conspiracy or that the lists were not
made to further the conspiracy, . the lists were admissible as co-con-
spirators' statements."1 75
During the 1983-84 term, the Seventh Circuit devoted considerable
attention to the co-conspirator exception. Commendably, the court's de-
170. See supra note 135.
171. Cf United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 43 (2d Cir.) (an examination of the context in
which the statement is made is necessary to determine if it was made in furtherance of the conspir-
acy), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978).
172. See supra note 158.
173. 704 F.2d at 986-87.
174. 722 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1984).
175. Id. at 1356.
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cisions appear to have struck an appropriate balance between the legiti-
mate competing policy interests that arise in cases in which the co-
conspirator exception is invoked. On the one hand, the Coe decision ex-
emplifies the court's rigorous application of the Santiago standard to en-
sure the exclusion of unreliable co-conspirator statements. On the other
hand, the court's decisions of this last term indicate that the Santiago
standard should not be so overly stringent that reliable evidence, needed
to secure conspiracy convictions, is also excluded. In Xheka and De
Gudino, the court demonstrated a willingness to allow greater admissibil-
ity of co-conspirator statements under the Santiago standard by recogniz-
ing that the trial judge may consider the contents of the statement in
issue in determining whether the declarant made it with an intent to fur-
ther the conspiracy or joint venture.
RULE 803(8): PUBLIC RECORDS AND REPORTS
Rule 803(8)176 sets forth a hearsay exception 177 for public records
and reports. The public records exception is based in part upon the pre-
sumption that public officials will perform their duties; that they lack any
motive to suppress or distort the truth; and, to a lesser extent, upon the
notion that public examination of records, when available, will reveal any
inaccuracies.178 Two other more realistic justifications for the exception
are that it is necessary because of the disruptive effect and inconvenience
to a public official called into court to testify to a matter which was accu-
rately reported and recorded, and the great likelihood that a public offi-
cial will have little or no recollection independent of a record or report
comprised of a multitude of trivial or mechanical entries. 179
The public records exception does not, however, sanction blanket
admission for all public records or reports; instead, the exception in-
176. FED. R. EvID. 803(8) makes an exception to the hearsay rule for:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agen-
cies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant
to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, in
criminal cases matters observed by police officers or other law enforcement personnel, or
(C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or
other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
177. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
178. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1632 at 618-21 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
179. Wong Wing Foo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 120, 123 (9th Cir. 1952) ("[T]here is a great likeli-
hood that a public official would have no memory at all respecting his actions in hundreds of entries
that are little more than mechanical. A further necessity lies in the inconvenience of calling to the
witness stand all over the country government officials who have made in the course of their duties
thousands of similar written hearsay statements concerning events coming within their
jurisdictions.").
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cludes important use restrictions to preserve the confrontation rights of
criminal defendants.' 80 For example, although subsection (B) of Rule
803(8) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for "matters observed
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which there was a duty to report,"
it also renders inadmissible "in criminal cases matters observed by police
officers and other law enforcement personnel."' 81 In United States v.
Oates, t8 2 the Second Circuit set forth an exhaustive canvass of the legisla-
tive history underlying Rule 803(8)(B) and (C), and concluded that in
addition to the explicit law enforcement use restriction of subsection (B),
there is clear congressional intent that law enforcement reports or
records are to be absolutely inadmissible against an accused under Rule
803(8)(B) or (C) or any other hearsay exception. 8 3
Only one case in the Seventh Circuit's last term involved the public
records exception. In perhaps the most controversial evidentiary deci-
sion of the 1983-84 term, United States v. Hardin,18 4 the Seventh Circuit
reached a result hopelessly at odds with the Oates doctrine. In Hardin,
the defendant was charged with possessing, with intent to distribute, ap-
proximately 344 grams of cocaine. At the jury trial, the government was
allowed to introduce a graph from a Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) statistical report which purported to show the average price and
purity of illicit cocaine in the United States. The price and quality data
from the statistical report were derived from DEA purchases and
seizures of illicit cocaine between 1977 and 1980. Over the defendant's
hearsay objection, the graph was used to show that the 344 grams of
87% pure cocaine, when diluted to average retail purity, had an approxi-
mate "street" value of $212,680. The government relied upon this evi-
dence as circumstantial proof of the defendant's intent to distribute. A
conviction followed.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the graph fell within the law
enforcement use restriction of Rule 803(8)(B) and was thus inadmissible
under any exception to the hearsay rule. The government contended that
the graph was admissible under Rule 803(8)(A) as a data compilation
setting forth the activities of the DEA or under Rule 803(8)(B) as a rec-
180. 120 CONG. REC. 2387-88 (1974) (statements of Reps. Dennis and Holtzman).
181. Subsection (C) of Rule 803(8) also sets forth a use restriction for "evaluative" reports by
providing that "factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted
by law" are only admissible in civil actions and against the government in criminal cases "in view of
the almost certain collision with confrontation rights which would result from their use against the
accused in a criminal case." Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
182. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
183. Id. at 72. Accord United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380, 381-82 (5th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 356 (2d Cir. 1978).
184. 710 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 286 (1983).
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ord of routine police observations. Without citation to any legal author-
ity supporting its decision, the Seventh Circuit held that the graph was
admissible as a data compilation within the meaning of Rule
803(8)(A).185 The court based its conclusion on this reasoning:
The conversion into statistical form of the average price and purity of
illicit cocaine purchased by DEA agents over a period of years not
only reflects the agency's activity but is important to its understanding
of the market it polices and the efficient performance of its regulatory
duties. That the observations of DEA agents in the field are the ulti-
mate source of the data does not affect admissibility. The compilation
of such information for the non-litigative purpose of identifying na-
tional trends in the illicit drug market provides little incentive for mis-
representation by these agents. Moreover, the government's need and
obligation to define its regulatory mission with accuracy clothe the re-
port with inherent reliability, while its preparation for congressional
review subjects it to public scrutiny for veracity.1 86
The result reached by the Seventh Circuit in Hardin is unsound and
finds no support in either the Federal Rules or case law. The court's
conclusion that the graph was admissible under Rule 803(8)(A) as a data
compilation of DEA's own activities is clearly in error because the graph,
which charted the average price and purity of illicit cocaine, was used at
trial to compute the "street value" of the cocaine seized from the defend-
ant, and did not purport to set forth, explain, or describe any activities of
the DEA itself. Query whether the graph might nevertheless have been
received, as the government alternatively argued, under Rule 803(8)(B)
as a record of routine police observations. Although a few courts have
held that the law enforcement use restriction of Rule 803(8)(B) will not
bar admission of routine and non-adversarial reports,187 the observations
of DEA field agents during the course of a seizure or purchase of illicit
cocaine can hardly be characterized as routine or non-adversarial. Fur-
thermore, it should be of no moment that these observations were not
specifically directed at the defendant in Hardin, for they were nonethe-
less tainted by the adversarial nature present in the investigation and ap-
prehension of other suspected law breakers.
The Seventh Circuit's finding of "inherent reliability" in the DEA
graph is also suspect. The court's opinion conspicuously fails to discuss
whether the person(s) responsible for compiling the DEA statistics had
the qualifications to make the report reliable in the first instance. In light
of the fact that many of the procedural safeguards employed by govern-
185. Id. at 1237.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Hemandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 864 (1980); United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976).
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ment agencies are inadequate to ensure "inherent reliability", 8 8 the
court's analytical oversight cannot be dismissed lightly. Furthermore,
because the DEA, like any other government agency, has a reputation to
maintain and protect, it does not necessarily follow that the agency's re-
ports are somehow free from bias and distortion.18 9
More problematic is the Seventh Circuit's uncritical acceptance of
the DEA graph since its reliability was further attenuated by multiple
hearsay.190 The court's statement that "the observations of DEA agents
in the field are the ultimate source of the data does not affect admissibil-
ity" 19' flies in the face of Rule 805,192 which proscribes the admission of
evidence containing multiple hearsay absent an individual hearsay excep-
tion for each separate level of hearsay. Finally, the Seventh Circuit also
did not address the question whether the government's imprimatur on
the graph might have caused the Hardin jury to accord the evidence
more weight than it deserved. 93
In sum, the Hardin decision rests upon an analysis that bristles with
analytical deficiencies. The court's holding represents an unwarranted
extension of Rule 803(8)(A) which, if followed in future cases, will emas-
culate the law enforcement use restriction of Rule 803(8)(B). Although
the Seventh Circuit may narrowly read Hardin to avoid this result by
limiting its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of the case,
such a decision must unfortunately wait until further reflection and con-
sideration by the court.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's evidentiary jurisprudence in the 1983-84 term
continued a trend of liberal admissibility through a flexible construction
and application of the Federal Rules of Evidence. An abiding sensitivity
188. See, e.g., Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816, 821 (10th Cir. 1981) (in a hous-
ing discrimination suit, probable cause determination of Colorado Civil Rights Commission based
upon ex parte investigation lacking procedural safeguards such as cross-examination was properly
excluded as untrustworthy).
189. See, e.g., Wetherwill v. University of Chicago, 518 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
190. The DEA graph arguably contained three separate levels of hearsay. The first hearsay level
was the observations of illicit drug activities by the DEA field agents. The second hearsay level was
the conversion of the DEA field agents' observations into data compiled in the statistical report.
Finally, the third level of hearsay was the DEA graph itself which purported to show in visual form
the summarized findings of the statistical report.
191. 710 F.2d at 1237.
192. FED. R. EvID. 805 provides: "Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay
rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided
in these rules."
193. See City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1981) (government
records and reports have an "aura of special reliability"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
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and deference to the broad discretionary powers vested in the trial judge
by the Federal Rules was a theme common to many of the court's deci-
sions. Perhaps only with the notable exception of the court's decision in
the area of public records, the Seventh Circuit commendably looked to
the policy and logic underlying the rules in deciding upon their proper
application. With almost a decade's experience under the Federal Rules,
the Seventh Circuit has demonstrated that it will, whenever reasonable,
interpret the rules creatively to promote the growth of the law of evi-
dence in the interests of justice.

